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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN COAL COMPANY, EMERY 
MINING CORPORATION and STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-v- Case No. 19134 
TERRY W. SANDSTROM, INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONSE BRIEF TO DEFENDANT SECOND INJURY 
FUND'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Second Injury Fund for the State of Utah is requesting 
this Court rehear and reverse its decision filed May 1, 1984 
in the matter of American Coal Co .. Emery Mining Corp., and the 
Utah State Insu rnnce Fundy. Terry W. Sandstrom. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, and Second Injury Fund. In interpreting the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 (1953, as amended 1981), this 
Court held that: 
The third paragraph then, read in light of 
the first paragraph, provides that the insurance 
carrier, while initially responsible for 
all temporary disability benefits and expenses, 
must be reimbursed for that percentage of 
the temporary disability expenses attributable 
to the pre-existing disability once the deter-
mination of combined disability is made. 
Not only does this interpretatio provide 
a consistent reading of the Section, but 
it also meets the recognized statutory purpose, 
which is to encourage employers to hire disabled 
persons. To make an employer and its insurance 
carrier not only initially, but also finally, 
liable for all temporary disability expenses, 
even though directly attributable to a pre-
existing injury, would undeniably defeat 
this purpose • 
.L:j. at pp. 4-5 (citation omitted). 
The Second Injury Fund now requests rehearing on this decision 
based on numerous affidavits from legislative members and members 
of the Advisory Board for the Industrial Commission which are 
offered to show that this Court misinterpreted the legislative 
intent in making its determination of the issues on appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND ON REHEARING 
The Utah State Insurance Fund requests this Court uphold 
its decision previously entered in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF AN ENACTMENT IS 
TO BE DETERMINED FIRST OF ALL FROM THE LANGUAGE 
OF THAT ENACTMENT. 
The Second Injury Fund, in its brief, goes through a lengthy 
discussion supported by the affidavits of legislators and Advisory 
Board members which is intended to show that the interpretation 
this Court made of Section 69 based on the language of the 1981 
enactments is in contrast with the actual intent of individuals 
involved in the drafting and support of the legislative enactment. 
This Court has determined on numerous occasions prior to the 
1981 amendments to Section 69 that medical expenses and temporary 
2 
total disability compensation were items that should be apportioned 
between an employer and its insurance carrier and the Second 
Injury Fund where there are combined disabilities resulting from 
both pre-existing conditions and the industrial accident in question. 
Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 
334 (1980); White v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478 
(1979); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. y. Ortega, Utah, 562 
P.2d 617 (1977). The determination in each of those cases was 
based on the language included in Section 69 that reads as follows: 
••• but the liability of the employer for 
such compensation and medical care shall 
be for the industrial injury only and the 
remainder shall be paid out of a special 
fund provided for in Section 35-1-68(1). 
As this Court adequately pointed out in its decision on May 1, 
1984 in. this case, that language was left substantially intact 
in 1981 with minor wording changes which are not relevant to 
this appeal. It presently reads: 
• but the liability of the employer for 
such compensation, medical care, and other 
related items shall be for the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be paid 
out of the Second Injury Fund provided for 
in Section 35-1-68(1). 
This Court, citing to Christensen y. Industrial Commission, Utah, 
642 P.2d 755 (1982), determined that "absent substantial evidence 
to the contrary, the Legislature is presumed to have been satisfied 
with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered portions of 
the statute and to have adopted those constructions as consistent 
with its own intent." American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, P.2d 
(filed May 1, 1984), p. 3. 
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It is still undisputed in this case that were this Court 
to uphold the decision of the Industrial Commission which disallows 
any contribution from the Second Injury Fund to the State Insurance 
Fund for Mr. Sandstrom' s pre-existing conditions; the Utah State 
Insurance Fund would, in fact, be paying for more than the amounts 
caused by the industrial injury. A person's amount of temporary 
disability subsequent to an industrial accident is a combined 
function of the extent to which that person had pre-existing 
injuries or impairments and the extent to which the industrial 
incident affected those pre-existing conditions. 
If the intent of the Utah State Legislature in passing the 
1981 amendments to Section 69 was to saddle the employer with 
the entire liability for temporary total compensation and medical 
benefits, it was within the prerogative of the Utah State Legislature 
to change the above cited language. Such a change was not made; 
therefore it is this Court's responsibility in determining the 
intent of the Legislature to first look to the language used 
by the Legislature. The legislative body is deemed to have spoken 
as a group and not as individual members; therefore legislative 
intent its elf is contained in the enactment. Provisions of the 
1981 enactment are directly in line with the language that existed 
in Section 69 prior to that enactment, and the provisions clearly 
limit the liablity of an employer to medical expenses and compensation 
payments resulting from the industrial injury only. 
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POINT II 
DEPOSITIONS OR AFFIDAVITS OF INDIVIDUAL LEGIS-
LATORS OR DRAFTERS OF THE LEGISLATION ARE 
NOT COMPETENT OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
It is an unassailable rule of statutory construction that 
what individual legislators, legislative drafters, lobbyists, 
or other individuals involved in the legislative process believe 
as to the intent of a specific enactment is not competent evidence 
for establishing legislative intent and will not be referred 
to by a court in making such determination. In a recent Washington 
case in which the Washington State Supreme Court was asked to 
interpret the provisions of an osteopath licensing bill, the 
Court made the following statement: 
Woodson (appellant therein) provided this 
Court with affidavits from some members of 
the 1959 Legislature. It was done in an 
effort to establish that they were under 
the impression that the holders of "limited 
certificates" could employ drugs. Legislative 
intent in passing the statute cannot be shown 
by depositions and affidavits of individual 
state legislators, however. 
Woodson y. State, 623 P.2d 683, 686-87 (Wash. 1980) (citation 
omitted). In another Washington case the Washington Supreme 
Court, in addressing legislative appropriations involved in a 
general assistance welfare program, expressed its opinion of 
the effect of an affidavit of a legislator as follows: 
What one legislator may have believed does 
not establish that the Legislature intended 
something contrary to its express declara-
tion •••• 
Pannell v. Thompson, 589 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Wash. 1979). 
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The Oregon Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of 
what effect the impressions of individual legislators or lobbyists 
had in determining legislative intent in their construction of 
an employment agency licensing enactment in the State of Oregon. 
In that case the Oregon Court noted: 
The Commissioner, in trying to determine 
legislative intent, took testimony from persons 
interested in the legislation (possibly lobbyists) 
about their observations of what occurred 
and what the legislators were intending. 
Such evidence is incompetent for this purpose, 
just as the testimony of an individual legislator 
would be. 2A Sands. Sutherland. Statutory 
Construction. Sections 48.10 and 48.17 (4th 
Ed. 1973). 
Murphy y. Nilsen, 527 P.2d 736, 738 (Ore. App. 1974), It would 
appear that the Oregon Court was addressing the type of testimony 
that the Second Injury Fund attempts to present herein through 
the affidavits of members of the Board to the Industrial 
Commission. It is the contention of the Utah State Insurance 
Fund that such evidence, as the Oregon Court indicated, is incompetent 
for such purpose. 
The Kansas Court of Appeals was asked to determine the meaning 
of legislative language defining survivor's benefits in a personal 
injury protection endorsement of an automobile liability insurance 
policy in the case of Hand y. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance 
Company, 577 P.2d 1202 (Kan. App. 1978). After being presented 
an affidavit of the chairman of the House subcommittee responsible 
for the legislation, the Kansas Court stated as follows: 
We are unable to square the affiant 's statements 
with the facts of the legislative action. 
We believe the latter speaks more loudly 
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and we are unaware of precedent for judicial 
ascertainment of legislative intent through 
statements of legislators made years after 
the event. 
l.Q. at 1205. The Kansas Court did state that the proper considera-
tions of legislative history a court can consider are "historical 
background, legislative proceedings, and changes made in a proposed 
law during the course of its enactment may be properly considered 
in determining legislative intent" (citations omitted). Lj_. 
In 1976 the California Supreme Court was asked to construe 
the meaning of a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice 
act. The defendants in that case attempted to establish the 
intent of the Legislature by introducing affidavits of three 
members of the Legislature who were involved in the passage of 
the provision the Court was construing. The California Court 
was very clear regarding the effect of such affidavits when it 
stated: 
The declaration of individual legislators 
as to the intent of the Legislature in enacting 
a statute are afforded little weight. 
Larcher v. Wanless, 557 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1976) at 510-511 (citation 
omitted) • 
The Arizona Supreme Court was asked in another case to construe 
the provisions of a revenue and taxation act passed by the Arizona 
Legislature in Golder y. Dept. of Reyenue. State Board of Taxation, 
599 P.2d 216 (Ariz. 1979). In the Court was very explicit 
regarding the effect of the legislator's statements in determining 
legislative intent. 
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The rule is clearly established in Arizona 
that one member of a legislature which passes 
a law is not competent to testify regarding 
the intent of the legislature in passing 
the law. Barlow y. Jones, 37 Ariz. 396, 
294 P. 1106 (1930); State Tax Commission 
y. Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial 
14 Ariz. App. 554, 557, 485 P.2d 277, 280 
(1971); Tucson Gas & Electric Co. y. Schantz, 
5 Ariz. App. 511, 514-515, 428 P.2d 686, 
689-690 (1967). "The intent of the legislature 
can only be determined by the language used, 
aided by the canons and rules of construction 
founded upon reason and experience." 
y. Jones, 37 Ariz. at 399, 294 P. at 1107. 
The same logic which prevents one legislator 
from putting a gloss on the meaning of a 
statute based only upon his own individual 
feelings also prevents a lobbyist or other 
interested party from doing the same. The 
testimony of the witnesses Arnold and Killian 
passing A.R.S. Section 42-123 was completely 
incompetent and must be disregarded in inter-
preting the meaning of that provision. 
lij. at 221. 
The Alaska Court, in Kenai Peninsula Burrough y. Kenai Peninsula 
Education, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977), was asked to use the opinion 
expressed in a letter by a legislator to determine the intent 
of the Legislature in passing a public employee collective bargaining 
act. The Court said such evidence was incompetent in making 
such a determination, and reliance on it would be error impermissible 
under previous Alaska cases. They finally held: 
Resort to the letter as means of legal inter-
pretation was, therefore, error. 
l.Q. at 423. See also: Haynes y. Caooral, 571 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1977); 
Southern Railway Co. y. A. O. Smith Con>., 134 Ga. App. 219, 
213 S.E.2d 903 (1975); Financial Indemnity Co. y. Camile, 288 
N.E.2d 861 (Ohio 1972); Leyy y. State Board of Examiners, 553 
8 
S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. 1977). 
It is clear that the affidavits appended to the brief of 
the Second Injury Fund in support of its petition for rehearing 
in this case are not competent evidence to establish the intent 
of the Utah Legislature in drafting the 1981 amendments to Section 
69. While counsel for the Utah State Insurance Fund has been 
unable to find a Utah case adopting the above cited rule of law, 
it is clear from the language used by courts making such a deter-
mination that there is a strong policy against allowing the testimony 
of individual legislators to be used in determining the intent 
of an entire legislative body. Such policy should be adopted 
by this Court as the policy of the State of Utah in order to 
avoid plunging Utah state courts into the impossible position 
of weighing conflicting testimony of individual legislators, 
and in determining the credibility of individual legislators 
when conflicts arise in individual affidavits. The Legislature 
has the full capacity to specify its intent by a clear and concise 
drafting of the statutory language itself which should express 
the intent of the body. 
The Legislature, by its clear and unequivocal language, 
intended that an employer not be liable for any compensation 
or medical benefits in excess of that amount attributable to 
an industrial injury. The Second Injury Fund cannot contradict 
that legislative intent embodied in the enactment itself. Any 
other interpretation of Section 69 requires an extremely tortured 
interpretation of that requirement. 
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POINT III 
EVIDENTIARY SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD 
AT THIS POINT IS UNTIMELY. 
From the time of the evidentiary hearing, during which the 
Administrative Law Judge rejected the Utah State Insurance Fund's 
contention that it be entitled to reimbursement for temporary 
total compensation and medical benefits paid to Mr. Sandstrom, 
the Second Injury Fund has been aware that the issue involved 
in this case would be what the Legislature intended in its 1981 
amendments to Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69. At no time in 
its response to the Utah State Insurance Fund's Motion for Review 
did the Second Injury Fund introduce the affidavits of individual 
legislators to explain the intent of Section 69. In its responsive 
brief on the initial appeal in this action the Second Injury 
Fund did rely on statements contained in the official records 
of the Utah Legislature which this Court could properly take 
judicial notice of in support of its position on legislative 
intent, but at no time did it attempt to introduce the affidavits 
of individual legislators. It appears contrary to proper appellate 
practice to, at this late date on petition for rehearing, introduce 
numerous affidavits of legislators and members of the Advisory 
Board not contained in any official record of the Legislature 
and which are not matters of which this Court can take judicial 
notice; but are, in fact, factual supplementations of the record 
on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should not reverse the determination previously 
made in this action granting the Utah State Insurance Fund reim-
bursement for a portion of temporary total compensation and medical 
benefits attributable to pre-existing conditions of Mr. Sandstrom. 
The majority clearly pointed out in the previous decision of 
this case that the Legislature had continued, even in the 1981 
amendments to Section 69, to limit the liability of an employer 
to that portion of medical benefits and compensation attributable 
to the industrial injury, and had not made a change to that provi-
sion. The Second Injury Fund tries to overturn that decision 
by introducing inadmissible and incompetent evidence at this 
late date from individual legislators, contrary to the well estab-
lished rule of law that such is not admissible to establish legis-
lative intent. 
Most importantly, as observed by this Court in its initial 
decision, determination that an employer would not be reimbursed 
for temporary total compensation and medical benefits that were 
attributable to a pre-existing condition would fly in the face 
of the statutory purpose of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69, 
which is to encourage employers to hire and retain handicapped 
workers. tr_ 
DATED of July, 1984. 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
I 1 7Ci1 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, this --1.L_ day of July, 1984, 
to the following: 
Virginius Dabney 
136 South Main, #412 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
12 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
